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OIL VS. OYSTERS-LESSONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL SITING FROM THE 
HAMPTON ROADS REFINERY CONTROVERSY 
Richard A. Liro!!* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A decade long controversy in Portsmouth, Virginia over the 
siting of a large, and as yet unbuilt, oil refinery has become a 
symbol of much that is wrong with the administration of Amer-
ica's environmental laws. Proponents of the multi-million dollar 
project complain that it has become entangled hopelessly in regu-
latory red tape; the Clean Air Act and prolonged disputes among 
federal agencies have been particular sources of frustration. Op-
ponents of the project contend that its proposed site is one of the 
worst possible locations on the East Coast for a refinery, and 
claim that it threatens Virginia's valuable oyster population. 
They also say that it will add to local air pollution problems and 
threaten the Chesapeake Bay's recreational resources. They have 
advanced these arguments in the many forums provided by state 
and federal regulatory agencies. 
How great a risk does the refinery pose to environmental qual-
ity, especially to the oyster population? How suitable is the site for 
a refinery and is it as poor relative to other locations as its 
* Senior Associate, The Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C.; B.A. in Politics, 
Brandeis University; Ph.D. in Political Science, Northwestern University. The views 
expressed are those of the author. He appreciates comments provided on earlier drafts 
by Joanne Berkeley, John Clark, J. Clarence Davies, Christopher Duerksen, Michael 
Mantell, Robert McEachern, Alan Roby, Edward Lee Rogers, and Jeter Watson. Per-
haps because of pending litigation, Corps and HREC officials did not respond to requests 
for comments. The author thanks J. Michael Hines, one of HREC's attorneys, for provid-
ing convenient access to hearing transcripts and other public documents. This research 
was conducted as part of The Conservation Foundation's Industrial Siting Project, 
f~nded principally by The German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Ford Foun-
dation, and the Richard King Mellon Foundation. 
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opponents claim? Is the refinery really needed? More importantly, 
from an institutional and legal perspective, how well have these 
questions been addressed in the regulatory process, and how 
might they have been addressed better? The Conservation Foun-
dation examined the project's odyssey through the regulatory 
maze because, in many ways, the controversy has highlighted the 
difficulties our environmental laws pose for those wishing to de-
velop new industrial facilities. These problems include, for exam-
ple, multiple permit requirements, fragmented jurisdictions and a 
high level of uncertainty in planning. Analysis of the Portsmouth 
project was part of a major study by The Conservation Founda-
tion of conventional and innovative regulatory processes across 
the United States and overseas.1 The study's principal objectives 
were identification of ways to speed decisions and increase cer-
tainty in industrial planning while, at the same time, protecting 
the environment and natural resources. 
This article has two purposes: first, to see how, when, and by 
whom the environmental issues raised by the proposed siting 
were treated in the regulatory process. This review should dispel 
some of the myths that have arisen from the controversy, includ-
ing the belief that the site was environmentally, the worst possi-
ble choice on the East Coast, and that the Clean Air Act was a 
primary culprit in the refinery's delay. A second purpose is iden-
tification of ways the siting process for the refinery might have 
been improved. Section II examines the project, the regional 
environmental resources at risk, project proponents and oppo-
nents, and the major regulatory requirements. Section III takes a 
close look at how oil spills, wastewater discharges, the need for the 
project, alternative site locations, and air quality effects were 
considered by regulatory bodies. Based on experience, in 
Portsmouth and elsewhere, Section IV proposes ways to better 
siting decisions. 
II. SETTING THE STAGE 
A. Project Location, Purpose, and Benefits 
In 1974, the Hampton Roads Energy Company (HREC) pro-
posed the construction of an oil refinery, and an associated 
1. The principal product of the study is C.J. DUERKSEN, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION OF INDUSTRIAL PLANT SITING-How To Make It Work Better (1983). 
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marine terminal, on a 623-acre parcel of industrially zoned land 
on the Elizabeth River in Portsmouth. The refinery would be a 
large one by industry standards, having a capacity to refine 
175,000 barrels per day of crude oil, and could be expanded to 
process 250,000 barrels per day.2 The marine terminal could han-
dle two 85,000 dead weight ton tankers and four barges.3 Storage 
capacity would be provided for 12 million barrels of crude oil and 
products.4 The facility would desulfurize and produce light prod-
ucts, such as gasoline and jet fuel, from sour, heavy crudes, and 
would depend on imports from the Middle East.5 The refinery's 
products would replace imports of refined products to the East 
Coast from refineries on the Gulf Coast and in the Caribbean.6 
Vessels serving the refinery would pass through Hampton 
Roads, one of the nation's busiest harbors, as measured by both 
ship movements and cargo tonnage.1 It is the largest coal export 
harbor on the East Coast, and is home to several military 
facilities, including a major naval base.8 Substantial shipments of 
petroleum already traverse the harbor and the Chesapeake Bay. 
Still, refinery proponents regard the harbor as relatively safe 
because of the low number of serious oil spills caused by ship 
collisions. In addition, many precautions would be taken in the 
project's operation, to reduce oil spills from vessels loading and 
2. United States Army Engineer District, Norfolk, Virginia, Final Environmental 
Impact Statement. Hampton Roads Energy Company's Portsmouth Refinery and Ter-
minal, Portsmouth, Virginia (Permit Action) 1 (Aug. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Corps 
FEIS]. The Corps FEIS is Exhibit 214 in the administrative record in the lawsuit 
challenging the permit issued by the Corps for the project. See National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985 (D.D.C. 1983). Copies of this and other EISs cited in this 
article can also be found in the author's files. Unfortunately, non-current EISs are not 
readily available to the public. One commercial source is Information Resources Press, 
1700 North Moore Street, Arlington, Virginia. A noncommercial source is the Transpor-
tation Library, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 6020l. 
3. [d. 
4. [d. 
5. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Civil Works, OASA (CW) Evaluation 
of the Hampton Roads Energy Company Permit Case-A Proposed Refinery and Termi-
nal Complex to be Constructed in Portsmouth, Virginia 1 (Oct. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Army Staff Paper]. The Army Staff Paper is Exhibit 1164 in National Wildlife Federation 
v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985 (D. D.C. 1983). "Sour" crudes are those containing relatively 
high levels of sulfur. 
6. [d. at 23. 
7. Corps FEIS, supra note 2, at 2-66. 
8. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COAL Ex-
PORTS AND PORT DEVELOPMENT-A Technical Memorandum (April, 1981) (available 
from U.S. Government Printing Office). 
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unloading at the terminal,9 and advanced technologies would be 
used to reduce emissions of air pollutants and discharges of water 
pollutants from the refinery. 
The City of Portsmouth welcomes the estimated $87 million the 
project would add to the city's current real estate tax base of $390 
million.lO The approximately 3,000 construction workers that 
would be employed to construct the refinery would earn about $59 
millionY The project, when operational, would employ 500 
peopleP Its annual payroll would be approximately $8.8 millionP 
B. Regional Environmental Resources 
The controversy over the refinery has focused on many envi-
ronmental issues, including the effect of the refinery's emissions 
on air quality.14 For the most part, however, public debate cen-
tered on the impact of the facility on water quality. Among the 
water quality issues, the principal worry concerns the fate of the 
local seed oyster population. Seventy-five percent of the oysters 
harvested in Virginia depend on seed oysters derived from the 
James River.15 The Elizabeth River on which the refinery site is 
located, flows into the James downstream from the oyster seed 
beds; however, tidal flows could wash oil upstream and damage 
the beds. Damage to oysters from the refinery's wastewater dis-
charges is also feared. The seed beds are regarded as unique and 
irreplaceable, and attempts to replicate them have been unsuc-
cessful. 16 In 1976, the value of the adult oysters developed from 
the James River seed beds was $3.9 million. 17 
Opponents of the project have also expressed concern that oil 
spills from ship collisions could harm the Chesapeake Bay's blue 
crab fishery as well as its enormous recreational resources.18 
9. See infra text at note 40. 
10. Corps FEIS, supra note 2, at 4-37. 
11. Army Staff Paper, supra note 5, at 23. 
12. Corps FEIS, supra note 2, at 4-33. 
13. Army Staff Paper, supra note 5, at 23. 
14. See infra text and notes at notes 167-86. 
15. Corps FEIS, supra note 2, at P-11. 
16.Id. 
17. Army Staff Paper, supra note 5, at 35. 
18. These and other objections to the refinery are reported in SuIzberger, Fight on 
Virginia Refinery Pits Energy Against Ecology, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1979, at AI, col. 4, and 
Carter, Virginia Refinery Battle: Another Dilemma in Energy Facility Siting, 199 SCI-
ENCE 668-71 (1978). 
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Much of the female blue crab population of the Chesapeake Bay 
"overwinters" in lower sections of the bay near to or in the chan-
nels used by ships serving Hampton Roads.19 The Chesapeake, the 
largest estuary in North America, provides over twenty-five per-
cent of the national catch of oysters, and more blue crabs than all 
other areas of the nation combined.20 In 1977, the commercial 
harvest of blue crabs from the bay was valued at nearly $12.7 
million.21 
C. Opponents and Proponents 
Approximately eighty percent of HREC is owned by Cox Enter-
prises of Atlanta, Georgia, a communications conglomerate, but 
HREC's creator is refinery entrepreneur John Evans, who has 
attempted to site refineries in several locations across the United 
States.22 Portsmouth's mayor, Richard Davis, who strongly 
backed the project, chaired the Democratic Party in Virginia and 
was elected the state's Lieutenant Governor in 1981. HREC's 
attorney, Gerald Baliles, was also well-connected politically, and 
was elected Virginia's Attorney General in 1981. While Virginia's 
Republican governors during the 1970s supported the project, 
HREC's Democratic political connections were to become an un-
dercurrent in public debate over a federal permit for the project 
during the Carter Administration.23 Adding to the political over-
tones of the controversy was the fact that Cox Enterprise news-
19. Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., Final 
Supplement to Final Environmental Impact Statement. Hampton Roads Energy Com-
pany's Portsmouth Refinery and Terminal, Portsmouth, Virginia (Permit Action) 2-9 
(Sept. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Corps FSEIS]. The Corps FSEIS is Exhibit 734 in 
National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985 (D.D.C. 1983). More recent 
investigations indicate that fewer (but still a large proportion of) female blue crabs may 
overwinter in the lower sections of the bay than was thought in 1978. Letter from Jeter 
M. Watson, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, to Richard A. Liroff (Feb. 1, 1982). 
20. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Research Summary: 
Chesapeake Bay 1-2 (May 1980) (EPA Office of Research and Development, Report No. 
EPA-600/8-80-019). 
21. Corps FSEIS, supra note 17, at 2-9. This is a "dockside" value. The retail value was 
nearly $40 million. See Complaint of the Plaintiff at 7, National Wildlife Federation v. 
Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985 (D. D.C. 1983). 
22. For a description of Evans's activities in Maine, see P. BRADFORD, FRAGILE 
STRUCTURES (1975). Bradford reports that Evans's refinery in Hawaii was commended 
by the local American Lung Association affiliate for its extra efforts and accom-
plishments in controlling pollution, suggesting a willingness by Evans to be responsive 
to environmental concerns. 
23. See A Newspaper Chain Wades into Oil Refining, BUSINESS WEEK 27-28 (Feb. 5, 
1979). 
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papers were active and strong supporters of Jimmy Carter's pres-
idential bid in 1976.24 
Opposition to the refinery was led initially by citizens organized 
as the Tidewater Refineries Opposition Fund, based in neighbor-
ing Newport News. They were succeeded by Citizens Against the 
Refinery's Effects, a group based in neighboring Norfolk. Opposi-
tion to the refinery has also come from seafood trade associations, 
civic associations, some local medical societies, and other envi-
ronmental organizations. The refinery has also been opposed by 
state and federal agencies knowledgeable about fishery resources 
including the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences, the Bureau of 
Shellfish Sanitation in the Virginia Department of Health, the 
National Marine Fisheries Service in the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration, and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service within 
the United States Department of the Interior. 
D. Regulatory Requirements 
The site for HREC's project was purchased by a subsidiary of 
Cox Enterprises in April 1974, and HREC filed its initial applica-
tions for major environmental permits in March 1975. Review of 
the project in courts and agencies was a long and complex pro-
cess,25 in part because authority for reviewing the project'senvi-
ronmental impact was highly fragmented. For example, the proj-
ect's impact on marine resources was reviewed by two state 
agencies issuing three environmental certifications. Its impact on 
air quality was reviewed by federal and state air quality agencies, 
each of which issued air quality permits. No state agency had 
authority to review comprehensively all of the refinery's envi-
ronmental impacts and to issue a permit based on such a review. 
The fragmentation had several consequences. First, even 
though each specific impact within an agency's jurisdiction might 
satisfy discrete legal standards, not until the United States Corps 
of Engineers became involved did any agency have the authority 
to consider whether its cumulative environmental impact made 
the project unacceptable when balanced against the refinery's 
benefits. Second, those opposing the refinery were given a num-
24. [d. at 28. 
25. The Appendix of the article traces the long permitting and litigation history of the 
project, between 1974 and 1983. 
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ber of opportunities in many different forums to raise their objec-
tions to the project, most of which concerned the resulting risk to 
shellfish from ship accidents causing oil spills. While refinery 
proponents might have regarded the opponents as taking unfair 
advantage of the multiple forums, in one sense, it was beneficial 
that authority to review the consequences of spills was so frag-
mented; the initial information on spills given to state regulatory 
authorities was deficient, while subsequent reviews by federal 
agencies generated significantly improved information. 
The principal environmental certifications which HREC had to 
obtain to construct the facility included the following: 
1. A "subaqueous permit" from the Virginia Marine Re-
sources Commission.26 The permit was required because the 
proposed marine terminal would involve construction on and 
dredging of state bottom lands in the Elizabeth River. 
2. A "401 Certificate" from the State Water Control Board. 
Under the terms of Section 401 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act,27 the board had to certify that the proposed 
dredging and construction for the marine terminal would 
comply with applicable water quality standards and Virginia 
water quality laws. 
3. An "NPDES Permit," also from the State Water Control 
Board. This permit was required by Section 402 of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act,28 because the refinery 
would discharge wastewater into navigable waters of the 
United States.29 
4. A "Dredge and Fill Permit" from the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers. This was required by Section 404 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Section 10 of 
26. See VA. CODE § 62.1-3 (1950). This statute requires that encroachments on state 
bottom lands be authorized either by statute or by permit from the Marine Resources 
Commission. The Commission, in its permitting, must take into account inter alia the 
benefits of a project, its effect on marine and fisheries resources, its effect on other 
reasonable and permissible uses of state bottom lands, and water quality standards 
established by the State Water Control Board. In addition to its regulatory authority 
over state-owned bottom lands, the VMRC also has regulatory jurisdiction over commer-
cial and sports fishing, marine fish, marine shellfish, and marine organisms in the tidal 
waters of Virginia. 
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). 
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). 
29. An NPDES permit places quantitative limits upon the discharge of pollutants 
from a facility. Virginia had been delegated authority by the Environmental Protection 
Agency to issue the NPDES permit, as provided for by the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). In issuing the permit, the board can take into 
account a host of factors, principally the type of industrial facility applying for the 
permit, the quality of the receiving waters, and applicable state water quality standards. 
The Environmental Protection Agency can veto a state-issued permit. 
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the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.30 The permit was re-
quired because HREC was proposing to dredge and construct 
a pier in navigable waters.3! 
5. In conjunction with the Corps of Engineers' considera-
tion of a dredge and fill permit, the Corps would be required 
to comply with the terms of the National Environmental 
Policy Act,32 which orders preparation of an environmental 
impact statement for any major federal action significantly 
affecting the quality of the environment. 
6. An air permit from the Virginia State Air Pollution 
Control Board. Although the permit would be issued by the 
state, it had to satisfy the requirements of the federal Clean 
Air Act. The permit was required because the project would 
be a major new source of oxidants in a region that exceeded 
federal ambient standards for oxidants.33 
7. A "PSD Permit" from the -United States Environmental 
Protection Agency. This second air pollution permit was re-
quired under the federal Clean Air Act's "prevention of sig-
nificant deterioration" program.34 This permit was necessary 
because the project would be a source of pollutants, such as 
sulfur dioxide, whose ambient levels in the region did not 
exceed federal ambient standards, but whose emission levels 
would nevertheless have to be controlled tightly to prevent 
significant deterioration of regional air quality. 
Because of the diversity of interests of the various agencies 
with jurisdiction over the project, no two agencies examined the 
same factors in reviewing the environmental impact of the HREC 
facility. Depending on their view of their legal authority, state 
and federal regulators issuing these permits either addressed or 
30. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 1344 (1982). 
31. The Corps' permit decision takes into account a broad range of factors, balancing 
"the benefits which reasonably may be expected to accrue from the proposal ... against 
its reasonably foreseeable detriments." Factors which may be relevant include conser-
vation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, historic values, fish and 
wildlife values, navigation, recreation, water quality, and so on. See Corps FEIS, supra 
note 2, at i. 
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. v 1981). 
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410,7501-7508 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Clean Air Act is discussed in 
greater detail, infra, text and notes at notes 167-86. An "ambient standard" pertains to 
concentrations of a pollutant in the atmosphere. The federal ambient standard for 
oxidants is now referred to as a federal ambient standard for ozone. An "emission 
standard" limits the discharge of these pollutants from industrial plants and other 
man-made sources. 
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7478 (1976 & Supp. v 1981). In essence, HREC needed a permit 
from the state to allow it to emit pollutants which already were plentiful in the region, 
and a permit from EPA allowing it to emit pollutants which were not yet plentiful, and 
which would not be allowed to become so. The net result was tight controls on both types 
of pollutants. 
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ignored oil spill and wastewater discharge issues, the need for the 
project, and the relative merits of the proposed project location 
compared to alternative sites. Section III addresses each of these 
interrelated issues in turn, and then addresses the discrete issue 
of the project's impact on air quality. 
III. POINTS OF CONTROVERSY 
A. Oil Spill Risks 
The preeminent issue in the Hampton Roads refinery con-
troversy has been the risk of oil spills from ships travelling to and 
from the refinery. Opponents and proponents of the project have 
argued in several regulatory forums over the magnitude and 
acceptability of the risk. Opponents of the project fear that a 
combination of human errors, weather conditions, and tides could 
produce an oil spill that would severely damage or even wipe out 
the shellfishery in the Chesapeake Bay. The proponents consider 
the chance of such an occurrence to be both speculative and 
slight. 
Projecting the chance of ship accidents and spills has involved 
review of data on ship movements and accidents, not only in the 
Hampton Roads region, but also in the nation and the world. It 
has also involved simulation of spills by computers and in hy-
drological models of the region. It has required making assump-
tions about future ship movements associated with HREC's oper-
ations and accounting for a myriad of other factors which affect 
the likelihood and seriousness of a spill. These variables include 
the spill's point of discharge, amount and composition of the spill, 
wind and tide conditions, dispersion patterns, and the effective-
ness of cleanup efforts.35 
How, when, and by whom estimates were to be developed, and 
how oil spill estimates were to be used were points of controversy 
during the review of the project. In addition, even when an 
agency decided to examine the risk of oil spills, the information 
necessary to do an adequate evaluation was not always available. 
Some regulators agreed that the risk of oil spills from ship acci-
dents was within their jurisdictions; other regulators disagreed. 
HREC's representatives discouraged state agencies from inter-
preting their jurisdiction broadly to include examination of oil 
35. Corps FEIS, supra note 2, at Appendix C. 
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spill risk. For example, HREC's permit application to the Virginia 
Marine Resources Commission for its marine terminal focused 
narrowly on dredging and cargo transfer issues, without address-
ing oil spill risk. The State Water Control Board expressed con-
cern over spills. Unsure about its authority to evaluate spill risk, 
and without the benefit of spill simulations, however, the Board 
granted HREC a wastewater discharge permit. It was not until 
the Corps of Engineers became involved that a government 
agency could rely on sophisticated oil spill analysis that went 
beyond the preliminary analysis conducted by the Coast Guard. 
For its Section 404 permit, the Corps of Engineers requested a 
computerized oil spill simulation by HREC's consultant, and con-
ducted a simulation on its own hydrological scale model of the 
Chesapeake Bay. The Corps' initial environmental impact state-
ment, however, failed to highlight the importance of the oyster 
seed beds, and the Corps' own simulation did not come until very 
late in the decision making process for the Corps' dredge and fill 
permit. 
These problems associated with the examination of oil spill 
risk-controversy over jurisdiction and delayed development of 
an adequate data base-contributed to the complexity and result-
ing delay of the HREC application review process. The assess-
ment of oil spill risk and the consideration of the potential envi-
ronmental threat from oil spills during the eight years that the 
Hampton Roads refinery has been under review will now be 
examined. 
1. State Water Quality Review 
a. Virginia Marine Resources Commission 
One regulatory agency which might have considered the risk of 
oil spills from ship collisions, but did not, was the Virginia Marine 
Resources Commission (VMRC), which issued a "subaqueous 
permit" for the facility in 1975.36 The VMRC, whose statutory 
36. Sources for this section include the transcript of the Virginia Marine Resources 
Commission (VMRC) public hearing of September 16, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Sept. 16 
Transcript]; the transcript of the VMRC's meeting of October 28, 1975 [hereinafter cited 
as Oct. 28 Transcript]; and briefs of the plaintiff and defendant in Tidewater Refineries 
Opposition Fund v. Marine Resources Comm., No. 2381-G (Cir. Ct. for City of Newport 
News, June 14, 1976). The briefs, which cite to the transcript, are in the author's files. The 
transcripts themselves are available from the Virginia Marine Resources Commission, 
2401 West Avenue, Newport News, Virginia 23607. See also Rowe, Panel Delays Permit 
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mandate is to protect Virginia's marine resources,37 heard brief 
testimony regarding accidents and safety in Hampton Roads 
harbor.38 Those testifying about the project's environmental im-
pact, however, seemed primarily worried about the impact of the 
refinery's treated wastewater on marine life.39 It also appeared 
that the commissioners were mostly concerned with oil spills from 
loading and unloading at the terminal, and with the effect of 
dredging during construction of the terminal on shellfish popula-
tions, rather than the risks posed by oil spills resulting from ship 
collisions. By a four to three vote, the Commission approved a 
permit for the project, attaching conditions restricting dredging, 
ordering deployment of a state of the art spill containment system 
at the terminal, and requiring compliance with state water qual-
ity standards established by the State Water Control Board.40 In 
issuing the permit, the VMRC thus addressed the reduction of 
risks to the shellfish population from dredging and from spills 
during loading and unloading; but spills from ship collisions were 
left unaddressed, and the impact of wastewater discharges on 
shellfish was left to be dealt with by the State Water Control 
Board. 
The Tidewater Refineries Opposition Fund filed suit challeng-
ing the permit.41 The group was principally concerned with 
wastewater discharges from the the refinery, and argued that the 
VMRC should not have acted on its subaqueous permit until a 
permit for the refinery's wastewater discharges had been issued 
by the State Water Control Board.42 The VMRC responded that it 
was only required to consider the environmental effects of the 
marine terminal portion of the project, and that the State Water 
for Marine Terminal, Virginian-Pilot, Sept. 17, 1975, at B1; Intent to Appeal Filed on 
Refinery Terminal, Virginian-Pilot, Nov. 27, 1975. 
37. The VMRC, in awarding permits, is guided by Article XI, § 1 of Virginia's Constitu-
tion. This section of Virginia's Constitution states that "it shall be the Commonwealth's 
policy to protect its ... lands and waters from pollution, impairment or destruction, for 
the benefit, enjoyment and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth." See also 
note 26. 
38. See Sept. 16 Transcript, supra note 36, at 48. 
39. At this time, HREC was planning to discharge its wastewater into a proposed 
regional treatment plant. It was feared that chlorination of the wastewater could create 
substances poisonous to marine life. See Sept. 16 Transcript, supm note 36, at 102-106. 
40. Oct. 28 Transcript,supm note 36, at 41-42. The permit, MRC 75-62, is reproduced in 
the Corps' FEIS, supm note 2, at L-2 to L-5. 
41. Tidewater Refineries Opposition Fund v. Marine Resources Commission, No. 
2381-G (Cir. Ct., for City of Newport News, June 14, 1976). 
42. Plaintiff's brief, Tidewater Refineries Opposition Fund, at sections I and II. 
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Control Board, when regulating wastewater discharges, was re-
quired to consider the impact on marine resources.43 The VMRC's 
action was upheld in an oral opinion of the Virginia Circuit Court 
for the City of Newport News in 1976. 
b. State Water Control Board 
The initial proceeding before the State Water Control Board 
(SWCB) involved the issuance of a "401 Certificate," a certification 
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act44 that the pro-
posed dredging and construction for the marine terminal would 
comply with applicable water quality standards and Virginia 
water quality laws. Like the VMRC, the SWCB was principally 
concerned about the immediate impact of dredging and the pre-
vention of spills from loading and unloading when the terminal 
was in operation. Appearing before the SWCB, the Tidewater 
Refineries Opposition Fund argued that the Board could not limit 
its review solely to the marine terminal's construction and opera-
tion, but must also consider the effluent from the related re-
finery.45 HREC's attorney countered that within the narrow 
confines of the Section 401 proceeding, the SWCB did not have to 
address the refinery portion of the project, and that the refinery's 
effluent would still have to satisfy other regulatory require-
ments.46 Because it would later consider the environmental im-
pact of the refinery's effluent, the board agreed that its review 
should be limited to construction and operation of the marine 
terminal. In January 1976, it unanimously approved issuance of 
the certificate.47 The certificate included conditions governing 
operating procedures during loading and unloading, disposal of 
dredged materials and bilge water, and related matters.48 
The SWCB reviewed the project a second time in 1976 and early 
1977 when HREC applied for an NPDES permit49 governing the 
discharge of wastewater from its proposed refinery into navigable 
waters.5O HREC had once considered discharging 445,000 gallons 
43. Defendant's brief, Tidewater Refineries Opposition Fund, at 3-7. 
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). 
45. Transcript of SWCB meeting, Jan. 8-9, 1976, at 10-12 (copy in author's files). 
46. Id. at 13-14. 
47. Id. at 33-39. 
48. The certificate is reproduced in the Corps FEIS, supra note 2, at K-1 to K-4. 
49. See supra text and notes at note 29. 
50. The application was filed on October 19, 1976. The SWCB's proceedings are de-
scribed in H. Gabel & B. Seng, A Case Study of the Hampton Roads Energy Company 
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of daily wastewater to a regional sewage treatment facility, but 
then decided to treat the waste itself, using an unconventional 
advanced treatment process expected to be especially effective.51 
This new plan required approval by the SWCB. The wastewater 
issue, however, was dwarfed by disputes over whether the SWCB 
was required to take into account oil spills from ship collisions 
when issuing its permit. This issue, as well as the data available 
on ship collisions, was the principal focus of board meetings dur-
ing a three-month period between December 1976 and February 
1977.52 
At the SWCB's initial hearing on the permit, the jurisdiction of 
the Board was discussed. While HREC's attorney argued that the 
Board had no statutory authority to consider marine accidents,53 
opponents of the refinery contended that oil spills would destroy 
the important James River oyster seed beds,54 and that the Board 
could consider the risk of oil spills from ship accidents. The SWCB 
concluded that it could consider evidence of oil spills which were 
likely to occur as a result of the refinery's location and operation. 
Moreover, it determined that a permit could be denied if the 
Board found that the threat of oil spills presented an unaccept-
able risk to state waters.55 
In considering the permit, the SWCB staff drew on Coast Guard 
24-30 (1980) (unpublished manuscript produced at the Colgate Darden Graduate School 
of Business Administration and Energy Policy Studies Center, University of Virginia, 
Charlottesville). See also Virginia Oyster Packers & Planters Assoc. v. State Water 
Control Bd. & Hampton Roads Energy Co., No. A-609 (Cir. Ct. for City of Richmond, May 
2, 1978). 
51. See supra note 39; H. Gabel & B. Seng, supra note 50, at 24. 
52. The discussion of the SWCB meetings, unless otherwise indicated, is based on 
transcripts of the meetings in the author's files. Copies are available also from the State 
Water Control Board, 2111 North Hamilton Street, Richmond, Virginia 23230. 
53. This argument, made in HREC's brief, is referred to in H. Gabel & B. Seng, supra 
note 50, at 28. While the effort by HREC's attorney to limit jurisdiction may have been 
tactically appropriate from a legal perspective, as a matter of political strategy, it 
probably was harmful. It may well have fanned skepticism by those citizens who might 
have wondered what there was to hide. Moreover, Jeter Watson, of the Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation, has noted that, "experience shows that agencies approve permits even 
when they consider a broad range of factors; in fact they may even more readily approve 
because they have so considered, and thus feel the record won't be seriously questioned." 
Telephone Interview with Jeter Watson (March 19, 1984). 
54. The testimony is referred to in a January 9, 1977 Memorandum from Assistant 
Attorneys General David Evans and Timothy G. Hayes to Board Members, Hampton 
Roads Energy Company NPDES Permit Application, p. 1 (copy in author's file) [hereinaf-
ter cited as January 9 Memorandum]. 
55. See id. 
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files for data on spills in the Hampton Roads area.56 The data 
indicated that, compared to spills from loading and unloading, the 
risk of spills from such "transit accidents" as collisions, ground-
ings, and rammings was negligible. The files revealed that a 
transit accident in 1974 had spilled ten gallons of oil, and another 
in 1975 had spilled twenty-five gallons.57 As small as these histori-
cal discharges from ship accidents in Hampton Roads might have 
been, the staff was wary about using them to develop projections 
for the future. The staff also noted that neither the amount of any 
accidental spill nor its costs could be readily predicted.58 
After an initial deadlock, the Board decided, by a narrow mar-
gin, to approve the permit.59 Attached to the permit was a condi-
tion requiring HREC to submit an oil spill control program for the 
SWCB's approval, at least 180 days prior to initial loading or 
unloading at the terminal.60 The plan was to provide for prompt 
containment, cleanup, and removal of every oil spill in local wa-
ters from vessels serving the refinery.61 
The statements by SWCB members explaining their votes for 
and against the permit reflected some of the major arguments 
that had been advanced by both sides in the controversy. The 
SWCB members opposing the permit stated that: 1) the Virginia 
Constitution provides that oyster beds, rocks and shoals are re-
sources to be held in trust by the state for its citizens, and these 
cannot be bargained away or exchanged for economic develop-
ment;62 2) the refinery would increase oil spills in Hampton 
Roads;63 and 3) the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences (VIMS) 
and the Bureau of Shellfish Sanitation had declared that an oil 
spill could have catastrophic effects upon the priceless oyster 
56. SWCB memorandum, Staff Responses to Questions Raised by the Board Members 
at the Hampton Roads Energy Company's Public Hearing (Dec. 23, 1976). 
57. [d. at 1. 
58. The staff observed that a single spill of 6000 barrels from an accident in 
Chesapeake Bay ten months earlier had caused approximately $700,000 in damages. [d. 
at 3. 
59. See transcript of January 31, 1977 SWCB meeting, at 35; transcript of February 18, 
1977 meeting, at 22. The permit, No. VA0053171, is reproduced in Corps' FEIS, supra 
note 2, at Q-A-2 to Q-A-8 [hereinafter cited as SWCB permit]. 
60. See SWCB permit, supra note 57, at Appendix B. 
61. Obviously, if such a plan were presented to the Board in the future, it would 
have behind it all of the momentum generated by previously completed work on the 
project. 
62. Transcript of January 31, 1977 SWCB meeting, at 23 (statement of George Cornell). 
63. [d. 
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beds.64 The SWCB members supporting the permit declared that: 
1) denying the permit would send a message to American busi-
ness that Virginia does not want new industry;65 2) oil traffic 
would continue to occur in the area, even without the refinery, 
and concern about oil spills was merely speculative;66 and 3) bene-
fits from the refinery would far exceed the potential threat posed 
by its construction.67 
The Virginia Oyster Packers and Planters Association chal-
lenged the permit, in a suit filed in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond.68 The plaintiffs raised a number of arguments in chal-
lenging the actions of the SWCB most of which related to the 
refinery's wastewater effluent.69 The plaintiffs also alleged that 
the board had failed to determine the effect of oil spills on 
shellfish,70 and that the SWCB had therefore violated its fiduciary 
duty under the Virginia Constitution as trustee for the oyster 
seed beds.71 The plaintiffs also cited statements made by the 
Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences, the Bureau of Shellfish 
Sanitation, and the National Marine Fisheries Service opposing 
the refinery on the grounds it would pose a significant risk of 
destruction to the seed beds.72 The court upheld the SWCB's 
actions, concluding that the board's decision to grant a permit 
was based on a satisfactory hearing record, and that the board 
had fulfilled its trusteeship obligations.73 
The decisions of the SWCB and the VMRC to approve the 
64. [d. at 24. 
65. [d. at 8 (statement of Millard Rice, Jr.). 
66. [d. at 31. 
67. [d. at 34 (statement of J. Leo Bourassa). 
68. See Virginia Oyster Packers & Planters Ass'n v. State Water Control Bd. & 
Hampton Roads Energy Co., No. A-609, at 3 (Cir. Ct. for City of Richmond, May 2, 1978). 
Because the NPDES program is a shared federal-state responsibility, challenges were 
also filed in federal court. These, too, were unsuccessful. See Chesapeake Bay Found., 
Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Va. 1978), vacated in part, 453 F. Supp. 122, 
dismissed sub nom. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 
495 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Va. 1980). HREC's NPDES permit expired on February 18, 1982 
and HREC applied for its reissuance. The SWCB is not processing the application, 
pending the outcome of litigation over ownership of the refinery site. See letter from 
Robert V. Davis, SWCB Executive Director, to Robert Porterfield, HREC Project Direc-
tor (Mar. 23, 1982). 
69. The complaints are enumerated in the Oyster Packers opinion, No. A-609, at 20-35, 
38-46. 
70. [d. at 35-38. 
71. [d. at 49-53. 
72. [d. at 50-51. 
73. [d. at 53, 64-72. 
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facility, but by narrow margins, reflected the degree to which 
many Virginians are concerned about the health of the Chesa-
peake Bay shellfishery. The citizen groups' determination dem-
onstrated that deeply held values were threatened by the re-
finery. The intensity of the disputes at the state level set the stage 
for continued debate over oysters during the federal permitting 
process. 
2. Federal Water Quality Review 
a. Corps of Engineers: Initial Evaluations 
As provided by Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, as amended, and Section 10 of the Rivers and Har-
bors Act of 1899, HREC was required to obtain a permit from the 
Army Corps of Engineers, since it was proposing to dredge a 
channel and construct a pier in navigable waters.74 The battle 
over whether this federal permit should be granted began in 1975, 
when HREC filed its application, and has not yet ended; a federal 
district court vacated the decision to grant the permit in 1983, 
declaring that there were procedural deficiencies in the final 
stages of the federal review process.75 The lengthy review process 
resulted, in part, from the need to satisfy the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),76 the requirements 
of Corps of Engineers regulations, as well as the intricacies of 
inter-agency protocols which govern permit disputes.77 
NEP A is intended to insure that high quality information on 
the environmental impact of major federal activities is available 
to public officials and citizens before decisions to begin projects 
are made. To satisfy NEPA, the Corps had to prepare both draft 
and final environmental impact statements on the permit appli-
cation.78 These documents are the principal vehicles for compiling 
key environmental information and subjecting it to review by 
agency officials, interested citizens, and others, and successfully 
navigating through NEPA requirements is not always easy. 
74. See supra text and notes at notes 30-31. 
75. See infra text at notes 212-15 for a discussion of this litigation. 
76. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
77. The Corps regulations and inter-agency agreements have changed since 1975. This 
discussion describes the regulations and inter-agency memoranda of understanding as 
they existed in 1975. See 40 Fed. Reg. 31,327, 31,338-41 (1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 37,155-58 
(1977). 
78. See supra text and notes at note 32. 
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For example, because the initial draft and final environmental 
impact statements did not adequately discuss alternative loca-
tions for the refinery, draft and final supplemental environmental 
impact statements had to be prepared. 
In addition, the review process can be further complicated by 
regulations promulgated by the Army Corps of Engineers. To 
ensure that significant resource controversies are resolved at the 
highest, most responsible levels of federal authority, Corps regu-
lations provide that if a state's governor disagrees with a Corps 
district engineer's decision to deny an application for a permit, 
then the decision is elevated to the Corps' division engineer.79 If 
federal agencies disagree with a Corps division engineer's decision 
to issue a permit, or a state's governor disagrees with a division 
engineer's decision to deny a permit, the final decision shifts to 
the Chief of the Corps in Washington and, if disagreements con-
tinue, to the Secretary of the Army. HREC's application was one 
of very few that was elevated all the way to the Secretary of the 
Army for a decision.ffi 
The following review of the Corps permit process discusses 
documents prepared by federal officials as the HREC application 
worked its way through the review process. These documents 
reveal not only how much information was available on the risk to 
the oysters from oil spills, but they also disclose how much weight 
the decision makers attached to this information. The federal 
documents are particularly intriguing because they use sophisti-
cated analytical approaches not employed by the Virginia state 
agencies to calculate risks to the oysters. Federal analysis of spill 
risk relied, in part, on simulations-computer or scale models 
of simulated oil spills in the Chesapeake Bay near the refinery 
which, taking a multitude of factors into account, provide an 
estimate of the likelihood of oil flowing over the oyster beds. These 
estimates were independent of such historical data as numbers of 
ship collisions and amounts of oil spilled. A second type of analysis 
relied on a base of historical data broader than Hampton Roads' 
own recent oil spill history; it projected future risks associated 
with the project by examining accident and spill experience 
throughout the world with the vessels that would serve the 
HREC refinery. 
79.Id. 
80. For a diagram of the several steps in the "permit escalation" process, see Feaver, 
Army Seeks to Rule Out 'Permit Escalation,' Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1981, at A27, col. 3. 
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The Corps' draft EIS,81 issued in November 1975, contained data 
on shipping accidents suggesting that Hampton Roads is rela-
tively safe. The statement revealed that ship accidents82 had oc-
curred in Hampton Roads harbor between July 1972 and January 
1975, but none had caused discharges of oil.83 By contrast, be-
tween 1969 and 1972, seventeen percent of the 1,437 worldwide 
tanker accidents in harbors, bays, and entrances had resulted in 
oil spills. The draft EIS made only passing reference to the oyster 
seed beds.84 
The final EIS,85 published in August 1977, relegated discussion 
of the importance of the seed beds to Virginia's oyster industry to 
its back pages. Two-thirds of the way through the voluminous 
document, the Corps reproduced this comment from the Virginia 
Institute of Marine Sciences (VIMS): 
The seed oyster beds of the James River are the basis of the 
Virginia oyster industry. These seed beds supply 75 percent 
or more of the seed which is transplanted to growing areas in 
other sections of the state. Furthermore, they must be con-
sidered irreplaceable. The Marine Resources Commission 
and VIMS acting jointly have attempted to establish seed 
beds at other sites but have been less than totally successful. 
Diminution of productivity of the James River seed beds 
would not be the usual case in which loss to the seafood 
industry would be approximately proportional to the geo-
graphic area involved. Because the seed beds are unique and 
are the basis of an entire industry, their disruption would 
spell disaster to a significant Virginia industry.86 
The Bureau of Shellfish Sanitation in the Virginia Department of 
Health expressed equally strong views in the EIS about the 
importance of the oyster beds.87 Comments from the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine 
81. United States Army Engineer District, Norfolk, Virginia, Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement. Hampton Roads Energy Company's Portsmouth Refinery and Ter-
minal, Portsmouth, Virginia (Permit Action) 4-72 (Nov. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Corps 
DEISj. 
82. Id. at 4-72. 
83.Id. 
84. Id. at 2-64, 2-65. Thirty-six pages of the draft EIS discussed impacts from potential 
oil spills on marine organisms, but attention seemed to focus on the Elizabeth River 
directly around the refinery site, rather than on the oyster seed beds upriver on the 
James. Evidently referring to the Elizabeth River, the draft EIS stated, "no unique or 
commercially valuable species will be adversely affected." Id. at 4-78. 
85. Corps FEIS, supra note 2. 
86. Id. at P-ll. 
87. Id. at P-3. 
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Fisheries Service referred to the views of these state agencies and 
also expressed their own opposition to issuance of the Corps per-
mit.88 
The final EIS also reported the results of computerized simula-
tions of oil spills, performed by a consultant to HREC and the 
COrpS.89 The study traced three types of hypothetical releases of 
40,000 tons of Mid-East crude oil over a period of four days, and 
was based on the "worst case" assumption that there would be 
little or no containment or removal of oil immediately following 
the spill.90 The final EIS commented that a spill in the Hampton 
Roads harbor "could potentially destroy the shellfish populations 
in the Hampton Roads itself. It could also have serious adverse 
impact on the bivalves in the Elizabeth and Nansemond rivers 
and adjacent areas in the lower James River."91 If the beds were 
totally destroyed and no shellfish of any type were taken from the 
James and other rivers for a period of two years, the EIS stated, 
damage could amount to $18 million. The statistical probability of 
a serious spill was estimated, however, based on historical local 
data, to be quite low.92 The final EIS concluded generally that the 
impact of oil spills on the aquatic environment is "largely specula-
tive due to lack of adequate, long-term studies and the great 
variability of circumstances that can occur."93 
Notwithstanding the final EIS's conclusion about the specula-
tive character of the risk from oil spills, the Corps' district engi-
neer was prepared to deny HREC a permit in late 1977.94 When 
Virginia Governor Mills Godwin issued a statement supporting 
the project, however, authority to make a permitting decision 
88. The EPA also expressed opposition to the Corps permit because of the project's 
cumulative environmental impact, even though the EPA had not opposed issuance of 
the state's NPDES permit, and would ultimately approve air quality permits for the 
project. The EPA's opposition to the Corps permit is expressed in many places. See, e.g., 
letter from Jack J. Schranz, EPA Region III Administrator to Colonel Newman A. 
Howard, Jr., District Engineer (Dec. 2, 1977) (copy in author's files). 
89. Corps FEIS, supra note 2, at 4-48, Appendix Q. 
90. [d. For recent discussion of the appropriate use of "worst case analysis" in envi-
ronmental impact assessment, see Yost, Don't Gut Worst Case Analysis, 13 ENVTL. L. 
REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,394 (1983). 
91. Corps FEIS, supra note 2, at 4-57. 
92. This conclusion was based on extensive U.S. Coast Guard statistics on maritime 
accidents in and around U.S. waters. See id. at Appendix Q-C, Tables 58-59. 
93. [d. at 4-49. 
94. The district engineer ultimately recommended to his superiors that the permit be 
denied. The district engineer's intention to do so prompted Virginia Governor Godwin to 
write a letter supporting the refinery. See infra text at note 95. 
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shifted to the Corps' division engineer.95 Had Governor Godwin 
not acted, the Corps permitting process might have ended at that 
point, two years after HREC applied for its permit. 
The district engineer recommended that the division engineer 
deny the permit, based on the following observations: 
1. Past cleanup of spills in Hampton Roads and Chesapeake 
Bay indicated that in many cases cleanup attempts are inef-
fective, or come after a considerable amount of oil has been 
dispersed. In severe weather, oil cleanup is virtually impossi-
ble.96 
2. The potential adverse effects of the refinery's effluent and 
oil spills presented a significant adverse risk to the future 
water quality of the James River Basin and the entire 
Chesapeake Bay.97 
3. Oil spills in Hampton Roads or the lower James River 
could destroy or severely reduce oyster seedbeds, and present 
a significant risk to the entire oyster industry. There could be 
a great economic loss to the state which could not be offset 
by the economic benefits of the new facility.98 
4. Issuance of the permit was opposed by VIMS, the Bureau 
of Shellfish Sanitation, the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency. 
The division engineer disagreed with the conclusions of the 
district engineer, and believed the permit should be issued.99 He 
characterized the costs and benefits of the project as "delicately 
balanced," but concluded that the "national need for energy 
slightly outweighs the potential impacts to the environment." The 
final decision, however, did not rest with the division engineer. 
95. Letter from Governor Mills Godwin, Jr. to Colonel Newman A. Howard, Jr., Norfolk 
District, Corps of Engineers (Dec. 27, 1977) (copy in author's files). Godwin's letter noted 
the Governor's conversations with Colonel Howard, in which the Colonel's inclination to 
deny the permit was indicated. 
96. Memorandum from the District Engineer to the Division Engineer, Application 
of Hampton Roads Energy Company for Permit to Dredge and Construct a Marine 
Terminal in the Elizabeth River, Portsmouth, Virginia, at 22 (Jan. 9, 1978). The District 
Engineer's report is Exhibit 328 in National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 
985 (D.D.C. 1983). The 6000 barrel Chesapeake Bay spill, which resulted in $700,000 in 
damages, is the kind of accident the district engineer could point to in support of this 
observation. See supra note 58. 
97. Memorandum from the District Engineer to the Division Engineer, Application 
of Hampton Roads Energy Company for Permit to Dredge and Construct a Marine 
Terminal in the Elizabeth River, Portsmouth, Virginia, at 25. 
98. [d. at 29. 
99. National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985, 989 (D.D.C. 1983). The 
Division Engineer's opinion is Exhibit 454 in this case. 
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Continuing opposition to the permit from other federal agencies 
caused formal authority over HREC's application to shift to the 
Chief of the Corps of Engineers. 
The Corps' supplemental EIS, prepared because the Chief of the 
Corps of Engineers believed he needed more information on al-
ternative sites before he could make a permitting decision, con-
tained additional data on oysters, crabs, and risks of spills. It 
highlighted, more completely than earlier EISs', the risk to 
shellfish from refinery related activities. For example, the final 
supplement reproduced a new study summarizing information on 
the blue crabYlO It reported that the Chesapeake's blue crab popu-
lation depends completely on use of the lower bay during portions 
of both its larval and adult stages. Because of this dependency, 
the supplement stated; "a major spill in the lower bay, occurring 
during critical seasons of the year, could severely reduce the 
viability of the natural population as well as the commercial 
industry." 101 
In November 1978, the Chief of the Corps of Engineers made a 
preliminary decision indicating that he favored permit issuance.lOO 
The Chief stated that Hampton Roads is one of the safest port 
complexes in the United States, as measured by both the number 
and severity of ship accidents.l03 The threat of a major spill would 
not present a new hazard to the Bay because oil was already 
transported in the region by water;l04 the refinery would simply 
alter existing transportation patterns.1OS He conceded, however, 
that a major oil spill could damage important commercial and 
recreational fishing and oyster operations, noting that "[t]his is 
a valid concern and an emotional issue."Hl6 Nevertheless, if a 
spill did occur, he concluded, "it would not necessarily affect the 
oyster and shellfish beds because of the distance to the critical 
areas and the containment, collection, and cleanup plans that 
would exist."107 If the oil did reach these beds, he found, the 
100. Corps FSEIS, supra note 19, at C-2. 
101. [d. at 2-9. 
102. Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, Hampton Roads 
Energy Company Permit Application Decision Paper (Nov. 28, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Chief's Decision Paper]. The Chief's Decision Paper is Exhibit 855 in National Wildlife 
Federation v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985 (D. D.C. 1983). 
103. Chief's Decision Paper at 10. 
104. [d. at 9. 
105. [d. at 9-10. 
106. [d. at 9. 
107. [d. at 10. 
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severity of impact would depend on many factors and, even in the 
worst case, the effects would not be irreversible.108 These impacts, 
he wrote, were "too speculative" to specifically warrant denial of 
the permit,l09 while beneficial results of the project were "cer-
tain."llo 
b. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Response 
The process of consultation between the Corps of Engineers and 
the federal agencies opposing the permit continued. The National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an agency 
within the Department of Commerce, funded a sophisticated 
analysis of oil spill risks conducted by Engineering Computer 
Opteconometrics, Inc. (ECO), a firm that specializes in maritime 
accident analysis.1l1 
By using local, domestic, and worldwide data, ECO attempted to 
predict the likelihood of oil spills in Hampton Roads. Information 
used in the ECO analysis included estimates of ship traffic to and 
from the refinery, past accident rates (but not spill rates) for 
tankers and barges in Hampton Roads, past accident and oil spill 
rates for tankers worldwide, and past accident and oil spill rates 
for barges in United States coastal ports.ll2 Applying oil spill data 
from this broad sample to Hampton Roads, ECO drew the follow-
ing conclusions: 
1. On average, there would be a spill of 1,290 barrels from 
tank barges once every 12.8 years.ll3 
2. On average, there would be a spill of 7,710 barrels from 
tankers once every 9.2 years,114 
3. A catastrophic1l5 marine accident, such as loss of most or 
108. Id. 
109. [d. at 13. 
110. [d. at 14. 
111. Engineering Computer Opteconometrics, Inc. (ECO), Proposed Hampton Roads 
Refinery. An Assessment of Oil Spills Associated with the Marine Operations, (Dec. 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as ECO Report]. NOAA's involvement in the permit review process, 
like that of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior, was 
authorized by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-668 (1982) and by 
other federal statutes. It was a continuation of the "permit escalation" process. See 
supra note 79. 
112. The oil spill rates for Hampton Roads were omitted on the grounds that they 
constituted too smal! a sample for statistical purposes. See letter from Terry L. Leitzel!, 
Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NOAA, to Michael Blumenfeld, Deputy Under 
Secretary of the Army 8 (May 9, 1979). 
113. ECO Report, supra note 111, at 1-5. 
114. [d. 
115. As used in this context, "catastrophic" does not characterrze the effects of a spill. 
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all of an entire cargo from either tank barges or tankers, 
could be expected approximately once in fifty years, although 
the projected size of such spills could not be determined.u6 
4. Hampton Roads' accident rate for tankers with a draft of 
thirty feet or greater, like some of those which would be 
serving the HREC refinery, is over twice the worldwide rate 
for oil tankers of similar size.ll7 
729 
These statistics painted a picture quite different from the 
statistics advanced previously by those stressing the safety of 
Hampton Roads harbor; they provided considerable ammunition 
to the critics of the HREC project. Based on the ECO report and 
other information, NOAA contended that the Chief of Engineers 
had understated oil spill risks in critical resource areas and urged 
denial of the permit.Hs 
c. HREC Response 
HREC angrily complained that the ECO report failed to ac-
count for existing oil transportation in Hampton Roads, and 
therefore attributed to the refinery some risks that were already 
present.u9 Indeed, oil was already being shipped up the James 
River directly over the seed beds.l20 Moreover, HREC contended, 
the refinery might actually reduce the risk of spills, by reducing 
the need for inter-ship cargo transfers in the harbor.121 
HREC also distinguished Hampton Roads from other harbors 
where oil spill accidents had occurred, concluding that it was 
inappropriate to project onto Hampton Roads, where few oil spill 
accidents had occurred, oil spill accident rates from other har-
bors.122 In sum, said HREC, "evaluation of the potential for dam-
Rather, it refers to the loss of most or all of an entire cargo, without regard to the effects 
of such a loss. For statistical purposes, catastrophic losses are distinguished from non-
catastrophic losses, because a few catastrophic losses (such as the 220,000 metric tons of 
fuel and crude oil spilled from the supercarrier Amoco Cadiz off the coast of France in 
1978) can skew the figures for average losses from all accidents. 
116. ECO Report, supra note 111, at 1-6. 
117. Id. at 1-4. 
118. Letter from Richard Frank to Lt. General John W. Morris (Dec. 28, 1978). See also 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Position Statement on the Siting of an Oil Refinery by the Hampton Roads Energy 
Company at Portsmouth, Virginia (Dec. 1978). 
119. Letter from Robert Porterfield, HREC Vice-President, to Lt. General John W. 
Morris (Jan. 16, 1979), at 2. 
120. Id. at 11. 
121. Id. at 2. 
122. I d. at 3. 
730 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:705 
age from oil spills ... requires informed judgment rather than an 
exercise in statistics and probabilities of questionable applica-
tion."l23 
d. Corps' Oil Spill Simulation 
In February 1979, a few months after publication of the ECO 
report and in the wake of continuing objections to the permit by 
NOAA, the Department of the Interior, and the EPA, the Corps 
generated additional information about the spill risks by simulat-
ing spills in its hydrologic model of the Chesapeake Bay.l24 The 
simulation showed oil moving farther up the James River than 
had been projected in the earlier computer simulation; tide condi-
tions would be favorable to the transport of oil across the oyster 
seed beds at least once each month, and favorable to the transport 
of oil across a substantial portion of the seed beds at least once 
each year.l25 The Corps modelers, however, did not provide any 
estimate of how much oil would settle on the oysters, claiming 
that their information was inadequate to permit such a forecast. 
The Corps staff noted that Hampton Roads historical data 
alone indicated a zero probability for a major oil spill; they added, 
however, that this limited analysis was unrealistic. On the other 
hand, they thought that ECO's predictions were too high, al-
though they were not sure by how much. The Corps report con-
cluded there would always be a possibility that severe adverse 
effects could occur. There would be some increase in the probabil-
ity of such effects because of the refinery's operation, but the 
increased probability was believed to be small.l26 
Armed with this new information, the Chief of Engineers rec-
ommended that the Secretary of the Army, to whom decision-
making authority had passed because of federal agencies' objec-
tions to the Chief's preliminary decision, issue the permit. He 
emphasized that the oil spill analysis confirmed his analysis ofthe 
123. [d. at 9. 
124. In considering whether hydrologic oil spill simulations might have been per-
formed earlier, it should be noted th~t it was not until 1978 that the Corps' Chesapeake 
Bay model was available for use. See Phillips, Giant Chesapeake Model is Closing Down, 
Washington Post, Mar. 11, 1983, at B1, col. 2. 
125. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Hampton Roads 
Energy Company Permit Application. Oil Spill Analysis (Feb. 1979). The executive sum-
mary of the report did not mention that the tides would be favorable to transport of oil 
across the oyster seed beds at least once each month. 
126. [d. at f-3. 
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relative safety of the Hampton Roads area.127 The Chief concluded 
that issuance of the permit was in the public interest, because the 
refinery's tangible benefits outweighed the speculative risks 
posed by the construction of the facility. 
e. Secretary of the Army's Decision 
The Secretary of the Army decided to issue the permit. 128 The 
basis for this decision was a paper prepared by the staff of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army late in 1979.129 In their paper, the 
staff confirmed the higher accident rate at Hampton Roads for 
large tankers, but they also observed that most of the accidents 
were at piers and anchorages or when vessels were moving at 
very low speeds.l30 The paper implied that the risk of spills from 
such accidents was therefore low. 
The staff reviewed oil spill data for the East Coast, Hampton 
Roads, and Chesapeake Bay, and concluded that, if the refinery 
were constructed, a catastrophic spill from a tanker in the 
Hampton Roads area, bay channel, and entrance would occur 
once every fifty-one years.13l Without the refinery, such a spill 
would happen once every seventy-one years.l32 The Army staff 
recognized the special significance of the oyster seed beds in the 
lower James River and the blue crab overwintering and spawning 
grounds in the mouth and lower southern portion of the 
Chesapeake Bay. After reviewing scientific evidence on the im-
pact of oil spills on shellfish, however, the staff stated that, "it is 
not believed possible that a catastrophic spill would eliminate the 
oyster or blue crab industry."l33 
Before making his final decision, the Secretary of the Army 
notified the Secretary of the Interior that he intended to approve 
the permit for HREC.l34 The Interior Secretary expressed his 
127. Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, Memorandum for the 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, Subject: Application for a Department of the 
Army Permit By the Hampton Roads Energy Company (HREC) for Work Associated 
with an Oil Refinery in Portsmouth, Virginia-Decision Memorandum 3 (Mar. 19,1979). 
128. See Army Secretary Approves Permit for Oil Refinery in Portsmouth, Va. 9 ENV'T 
REP. (BNA) 1642 (Dec. 14, 1979). 
129. Army Staff Paper, supra note 5. 
130. [d. at 33. 
131. [d. at 72. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. at 50, 35-36. 
134. Complaint of Plaintiff at 22, National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 
985 (D.D.C. 1983). 
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belief that sites on the East Coast other than Portsmouth were 
environmentally preferable, and that the refinery was neither 
environmentally nor economically in the public interest.l35 The 
Administrator of NOAA also responded to the Secretary's deci-
sion, contending that the risks to the oyster beds had been sub-
stantially underestimated in the Army staff paper.l36 Neverthe-
less, in December 1979, the Secretary of the Army ordered is-
suance of the permit.137 
3. Concluding Observations: Oil Spill Risk Analysis 
The citizen groups, fishery interests, and federal and state 
regulators involved in the Hampton Roads controversy had strik-
ingly different perceptions of the risk posed by oil spills to the 
oyster seed beds. Both before and after simulations were done, 
some believed the risk too great to justify construction of the 
facility and others believed it to be slight. Local history suggested 
to many that the chance of a transportation-related oil spill in the 
harbor was minimal. Experience elsewhere, however, suggested 
that people make errors, cleanup efforts are delayed, and the 
resulting spills can produce severe damage. Those who believed 
that the risks to the oysters were slight tended to emphasize local 
history, and argued that the combination of factors necessary for 
a catastrophic spill was too remote to justify stopping the project. 
Those believing the risks to be too great emphasized the major 
problems caused by spills elsewhere. 
The debate over the risk of oil spills is reminiscent of disputes 
over nuclear power plants. Many oppose nuclear power plants 
because the consequences of an accident could be horrendous and 
long-term, even though the chance of a catastrophic accident is 
statistically small. In Portsmouth, although spill prevention and 
cleanup plans would be prepared, and many meteorological, 
ecological, and man-made factors would have to coincide to cause 
a catastrophic accident, there remained real concern that if an 
accident did occur, the seed beds supporting Virginia's oyster 
industry and the blue crab fishery could be substantially de-
stroyed. 
The dispute among federal agencies prolonged the final decision 
on the Corps' permit by two years. It is clear that during the 
135. [d. 
136. [d. 
137. See supra note 128. 
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later stages of review, information available to the federal agen-
cies for such a decision improved. The information was substan-
tially better than that available to the State Water Control Board 
and Virginia Marine Resources Commission when state permits 
were issued. 
Arguably, so much additional time should not have been spent 
generating new data. There is, however, an inherent value in 
developing a deliberative process where the development, ex-
change, and critical evaluation of information provides some as-
surance that the decision reached is well-reasoned, and is based 
on a thorough analysis of appropriate data and alternative sets of 
policy assumptions. After all, the fundamental purpose of the 
decision-making process is not simply issuance of a permit for a 
project that the applicant believes is worthwhile. Rather, the 
purpose of the review process is to ensure that the project is sited 
appropriately, that adequate environmental safeguards are in-
corporated, that vital environmental resources are not exposed to 
undue risk, and that other public concerns are accommodated. 
The information to make these judgments was inadequate when 
the original permit application was filed, and much time was 
spent remedying this deficiency. 
B. The Need for the Refinery 
1. Federal and State Review 
Several of the federal and state regulators, when issuing per-
mits for the HREC facility, referred to the benefits that would 
flow from the refinery's construction and operation. Portsmouth 
certainly was expecting benefits from the refinery, but whether 
the refinery is needed may be an open question. Many assump-
tions were made by officials in evaluating the need for the re:' 
finery, as they considered whether the benefits from its construc-
tion outweighed potential risks to the oyster industry. HREC's 
supporters tended to justify the project by pointing to a shortage 
of refinery capacity on the East Coast, and also suggested that 
the project would contribute to national security. The validity of 
these claims is not easily evaluated, and the national policy ar-
guments were given different weight in each forum which re-
viewed the facility. 
The Virginia Marine Resources Commission specifically ruled 
out the consideration of "need" and the availability of surplus 
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refinery capacity elsewhere when it awarded its subaqueous 
permit. The State Water Control Board, when it awarded its 
NPDES permit, thought there would be local benefits from the 
refinery, and did not want to discourage major businesses from 
siting in Virginia, but otherwise did not consider the larger ques-
tion of national need. The Corps of Engineers' final supplemental 
EIS implied that the refinery was necessary. It noted that: 
domestic refineries were operating near capacity in 1977; over 2.1 
million barrels per day of refined products were being imported; 
domestic refining capacity would be inadequate to meet domestic 
demand in the event of an Arab oil embargo; and domestic de-
mand was estimated to be 22 million barrels per day by 1985.138 
The staff of the Assistant Secretary of the Army did not seem 
especially impressed in 1979 by the national security arguments 
made on the refinery's behalf. In their discussion paper, they 
noted that the Department of Energy had provided a "fairly 
persuasive, qualitative case" for additional East Coast refinery 
capacity, but observed that the Department had "by no means 
established that the United States economy or national security 
would be crippled in any fundamental sense without additional 
East Coast refineries."l39 The staff concluded that the HREC 
project probably would reduce imports of refined products, and 
would provide needed storage capacity, but that its impact on 
national security would be small,140 
The Army staff also examined the alternative of increased 
production at Caribbean refineries, which were operating at only 
sixty-six percent of capacity.141 During the 1960's and early 1970's, 
federal energy policies had provided an incentive for construction 
of refineries in the Caribbean to serve East Coast markets, but 
these facilities had become underused because of subsequent 
changes in these policies. The Army staff concluded these 
refineries could contribute only a fraction of HREC's produc-
tion.l42 
138. Corps FSEIS, supra note 19, at 1-2, 1-6. 
139. Army Staff Paper, supra note 5, at 24. 
140. [d. at 21. 
141. [d. at 90-91. 
142. The army staff reached this conclusion by noting that if the Caribbean refineries' 
production was raised to 90% of capacity, and the additional output was all sent to the 
United States, 912,000 additional barrels per day would be shipped. Since Hampton 
Roads would receive only 10% of this, however, consonant with existing trends, it would 
receive 91,200 barrels, only 4,600 barrels of which would come from U.S.-owned refineries. 
See Army Staff Paper, supra note 5, at 91. 
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Another dimension of the Army staff's analysis of need was an 
assessment of the "national benefits" which would flow from con-
struction of the facility. For this assessment, "national benefit" 
was narrowly defined as reductions in the cost of transporting 
petroleum products to markets on the East Coast. The staff con-
cluded that these benefits, even when calculated conservatively, 
outweighed the costs from oil spills, although the net benefits 
would be lost if a large, catastrophic oil spill were to occur in the 
lower Chesapeake Bay area.l43 
The Army staff labeled the risk from oil spills "the gut issue." 
They asked, "is the probability of risk which could potentially 
seriously impact a high quality resource worth taking given the 
otherwise certain and substantial national benefit which would 
accrue from the refinery?"l44 The staff clearly had come to regard 
the benefits from the refinery as certain and substantial, al-
though to some of the refinery's opponents the project's benefits 
were no less speculative than the risk from oil spills. To the 
project's critics, possible savings to consumers from the 
Portsmouth refinery simply were not worth the risk to the oys-
ters, the outcome of the Army's benefit-cost analysis notwith-
standing. 
2. Concluding Observations About Need 
World and domestic oil markets were in turmoil during much of 
the time permits for the HREC refinery were being considered by 
federal and state officials.l45 Assumptions about need that seemed 
reasonable and solid one year might seem archaic and useless the 
next.I46 Just as HREC was deciding upon Portsmouth as the site 
for its refinery, the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and 1974 dramat-
143. Army Staff Paper, supra note 5, at 69. 
144. ld. at 99-100. 
145. For background on changing markets and, in particular, the impact of changing 
federal policies on them, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, THE 
UNITED STATES REFINING POllCY IN A CHANGING WORLD OIL ENVIRONMENT (June 29, 
1979) General Accounting Office, Report No. EMD-79-59; HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE 
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND POWER U.S. REFINERIES: A 
BACKGROUND STUDY, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1980) (Comm. Print 54); UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TRENDS IN REFINERY CAPACITY AND UTILIZATION (Report 
No. DOE/RA-0010); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. 
ON ENERGY AND POWER, THE ENERGY FACT BOOK, 96th Cong. 2d. Sess. 60 (Comm. Print 
1980). 
146. See Marshall, Energy Forecasts: Sinking to New Lows, SCIENCE 1354 (June 20, 
1980). 
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ically drove up the world price of crude oil and demonstrated the 
vulnerability of the United States to supply interruptions. Shortly 
thereafter, changes in federal policies governing imports of crude 
oil and petroleum products, and adoption of federal oil allocation 
rules providing for subsidies for small refineries prompted a dra-
matic rise in domestic refinery capacity.147 
Disruption of oil supplies from Iran in 1979 further drove up the 
price of oil. Then, in the early 1980's, a deep national recession 
combined with energy conservation measures caused national 
petroleum consumption to nosedive; domestic oil consumption 
dropped from its peak of 18.8 million barrels per day in 1978 to 15.3 
million barrels per day in 1982.148 Domestic refinery usage dropped 
by twenty to thirty-five percent during a two-year period. The 
elimination of federal subsidies for small refineries caused many 
to close, while major oil companies closed some of their large but 
very old refineries. In a two-year period in the early 1980's, over 
two million barrels of production capacity was shut down.149 
HREC had first proposed its refinery when energy consumption 
had been growing strongly for twenty years and had been closely 
linked to economic growth. That historic linkage was broken in 
the 1970's in the face of massive national energy conservation 
efforts. Even if HREC had succeeded in having its refinery opera-
tional by the late 1970's, perhaps it would have lost substantial 
amounts of money. With the recent drop in domestic petroleum 
consumption, and with future growth rates expected to be far 
below historic levels, the need for HREC's refinery in Portsmouth 
is now quite questionable. 
C. Consideration of Alternative Sites 
1. Site Comparisons Conducted 
The Hampton Roads area had considerable appeal to HREC. 
Hampton Roads harbor has a deep channel, and the region's 
military facilities require large amounts of fuel. Portsmouth wel-
147. See supra note 145. See also Corigan, Without Federally Guaranteed Supplies, 
Small Refiners are Scrambling for Oil, NATIONAL JOURNAL 636-640 (Apr. 18, 1981); Nulty, 
Teakettle Refiners Scramble to Survive, FORTUNE 47-48 (July 13, 1981). 
148. See McCarley & Richman, Trends in U.S. Energy Since 1978, in U.S. ENERGY 
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW, i-vii (May 1983). See also 
The Oil Glut Isn't Going Away BUSINESS WEEK 38-39 (Nov. 8, 1982). 
149. See Mack, The Other Glut, 43-44 FORBES (Mar. 18, 1983); Cost Squeeze on Oil 
Refineries, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1982. 
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corned the refinery, and the proposed waterfront site, already 
zoned for industry, stood waiting for use. In view of the perceived 
risks to valuable aquatic resources, however, opponents argued 
that Portsmouth was not a suitable location for a refinery. Alter-
native sites, in fact, had been considered by HREC and permitting 
agencies. 
HREC creator John Evans' initial search for a suitable site had 
as its primary concerns engineering and economic factors. ISO The 
search predated enactment of NEP A in 1969. Some of these en-
gineering and economic factors included location in a good mar-
keting area, availability of economical transportation facilities, 
and availability of adequate industrially zoned land both for ini-
tial construction and future expansion. Three sites outside of 
Virginia-Machiasport, Maine; Newport, Rhode Island; and 
Savannah, Georgia-were considered, as were four additional 
sites in the Hampton Roads area. The search narrowed and, in 
1974 HREC thoroughly studied a refinery site on the Nansemond 
River, farther upstream on the James River from Hampton 
Roads. A preliminary environmental impact assessment report 
was prepared, and several alternative pipeline configurations and 
marine terminal sites to serve the refinery were considered. In 
the fall of 1974, however, because of its economic, engineering, and 
environmental advantages, HREC opted to build its refinery and 
marine terminal on Portsmouth's waterfront. No more alterna-
tive sites were considered until June, 1978, when the Chief of the 
Corps of Engineers decided that he could not determine whether 
Portsmouth was an environmentally acceptable site on the basis 
of existing information.l5l He wanted information on alternative 
sites, to ensure that a reasonable balance was being struck at the 
Portsmouth site among environmental, economic, and engineer-
ing factors. 
At the Chief's request, an inter-agency task force met to exam-
ine alternatives. Agencies represented included the Department 
of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, 
the National Marine Fisheries Service within NOAA, the Coast 
Guard, and the Materials Transportation Bureau from the De-
partment of Transportation.152 The task force worked quickly. All 
150. This discussion of alternative sites is based on the Corps DEIS, supra note 83, at 
6-1. 
151. Corps FSEIS, supra note 19, at 1-1. 
152. [d. 
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Corps district and division offices along the East Coast, as well as 
all the agencies represented on the task force, were invited to 
nominate potential sites. Sixty-seven sites were suggested for 
examination.l53 
The sixty-seven sites were evaluated by the task force members 
according to selected criteria. Most of the sixty-seven were elimi-
nated for environmental reasons; nineteen were chosen for fur-
ther review.l54 The task force developed a matrix summarizing 
the characteristics ofthe alternative sites.l55 The matrix was used 
to rate the nineteen sites according to seventeen "key descrip-
tors," such as water supply, presence of wetlands, and proximity 
to a crucial habitat. A rating of "A" was the best possible score, 
indicating no perceived problems or impacts, and "E" was the 
worst, representing severe adverse problems or impacts. The task 
force proceeded on the assumption that the environmental ac-
ceptability of a site was "critically dependent" upon the absence 
of very low-"D" or "E" -scores. 156 By this criterion, the 
Portsmouth site was ranked very low, because it was assigned 
twelve "D"s and "E"s. The Department of Energy representative 
contended, however, that no sites proposed were as good as 
Portsmouth and Eastport, Maine, when economic and engineer-
ing considerations also were taken into account.157 
The matrix caused a furor. HREC condemned it, suggesting 
that the ratings were internally inconsistent and bore "only occa-
sional accidental correspondence to the data presented in or ref-
erenced by the text of the document."158 Environmentalists and 
NOAA used it to support their contention that the Portsmouth 
site was the worst of all those surveyed.159 
153. Alternatives at these sites included expansion of existing refineries, reactivation 
of closed refineries, and, in most cases, use of offshore mooring facilities with a refinery 
on the mainland. Where expansion was possible, the expected increase in production did 
not reach 175,000 barrels per day. One closed refinery could be reactivated, but at an 
increased capacity of only 70,000 barrels per day. Some of the alternative sites had been 
previously discussed in detail in a 1973 interim report on Atlantic Coast Deep Water Port 
facilities by the Corps. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Philadelphia District, Interim 
Report. Atlantic Coast Deep Water Port Facilities Study. Eastport, Maine to Hampton 
Roads, VirginIa (June 1973). 
154. Corps FSEIS, supra note 19, at 1-21. 
155. ld. at 1-91 through 96. 
156. ld. at 1-97. 
157. ld. at 1-99. 
158. Letter from Robert E. Porterfield, Vice-President, HREC, to Lt. General John W. 
Morris, Chief of Engineers (Oct. 20, 1978) (accompanying comments on FSEIS). The 
quoted phrase is found on page 9 of the comments. 
159. See, e.g., Baker, Refinery on the Bay: An Unwarranted Risk, The Baltimore Sun, 
Mar. 21, 1979, at A19. 
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The Chief of the Corps of Engineers and the staff of the Secre-
tary of the Army agreed with HREC that the matrix was prob-
lematic;l60 they demonstrated that the task force analysis was 
flawed by severe internal inconsistencies. After constructing their 
own matrix, the Army staff concluded that four of the alternative 
sites were comparable to the Portsmouth site and that no site was 
clearly preferable to the Portsmouth site when environmental, 
economic, and engineering factors were considered. lSI The Army 
staff concluded that Portsmouth was a clearly acceptable location 
and was not the most environmentally damaging site.1OO The staff 
contended that although other sites might be environmentally 
superior to the Hampton Roads site, this did not preclude the 
Secretary of the Army from granting a permit to HREC.l63 A 
permit could be issued if the Secretary considered environmental 
factors and if he concluded that "in toto, Portsmouth is an accept-
able location for a refinery ."164 
2. Concluding Observations on Alternative Sites 
The competing analyses of alternative sites demonstrate how 
different conclusions can be reached about the desirability of 
industrial development at a particular location, depending on 
which analytical criteria are employed, and how much weight 
they carry. The Hampton Roads example demonstrates the sub-
jectivity of the process of analyzing competing sites for develop-
ment. Parties will reach vastly different conclusions about the 
merits of a particular site, even when seemingly objective analy-
ses are undertaken, such as the task force "matrix" evaluation, 
and the later Army staff evaluation. 
The Portsmouth example highlights another problem in the site 
comparison process. The evaluation of alternative sites is re-
quired by NEPA.l65 Yet, the exercises in 1978 and 1979 were far 
160. Chief's Decision Paper, supra note 102, at 7; Army Staff Paper, supra note 5, 
at 80. 
161. Army Staff Paper, id. at 91. 
162. [d. 
163. [d. 
164. [d.; NEPA requires that the Secretary of the Army consider environmental 
impacts, but does not require that the Secretary's decision be in favor of the environ-
mentally preferable alternative, as long as all alternatives are identified and considered. 
See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (1983). 
165. See generally, RICHARD A. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: 
NEPA AND ITS AFI'ERMATH (1976). 
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different from the idealized analysis of alternatives contemplated 
by the statute.l66 The analysis should occur before, not after, 
resources are committed to a particular alternative. That was not 
the case here, and it illustrates the problems inherent in applying 
NEPA to private projects where the bulk of the planning has 
been done before the projects are presented to federal agencies 
for review. 
D. Air Quality Issues 
The Portsmouth refinery confronted some of the same air qual-
ity regulatory issues that confounded many other industrial proj-
ects in the mid-1970's. HREC was obliged to comply with the 
requirements of the Clean Air Act of 1970, one of the most com-
plex federal environmental statutes.167 The Act established a fed-
eral program for cleaning up the nation's air; substantial pro-
gram responsibilities, including issuance of most permits, were 
assigned to state air pollution control agencies.l68 State agencies 
would develop "state implementation plans" (SIPs) subject to 
EPA approval, designed to achieve federal ambient standards for 
air quality by mid-1975.1f11 These state plans would include pro-
grams to abate pollution from existing sources and to review 
proposed new pollution sources. The plans would regulate the 
discharge of such common pollutants as carbon monoxide, par-
ticulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and oxidants 
contributing to smog. 
When HREC applied in early 1975 for an air quality permit 
from the State Air Pollution Control Board (SAPCB), the EPA 
was just realizing it would have to fashion a program for states to 
use to allow major new pollution sources in areas still dirtier than 
federal ambient standards-so called nonattainment areas-
without compromising existing standards. Since the Hampton 
Roads region was a nonattainment area for oxidants and emis-
sions from HREC's project would contribute to this oxidant prob-
lem, HREC became subject to evolving EPA policies. 
166. Liroff, NEPA-Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going? 46 JOURN. AM. 
PLANNING Assoc. 154-61 (1980). 
167. The Clean Air Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For 
information on the act prior to its amendment in 1977, see W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW, chapter III (1977). 
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
169. The deadline was later extended to December 31, 1982. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1) 
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
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EPA also was only just beginning to develop its prevention of 
significant deterioration (PSD) program for areas with air cleaner 
than the national ambient standards for sulfur dioxide and par-
ticulates. The Hampton Roads region was such an area. The PSD 
program set tight limits on emissions from major new sources and 
sharply limited the permissible increase in sulfur dioxide and 
particulates above existing ambient levels. Such tight limits, in 
theory, would keep such areas from becoming havens for polluters 
who might degrade their air to the levels of the national ambient 
standards. As the PSD program evolved, HREC found itself sub-
ject to these new and shifting policies as well. 
In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act. In addition to 
extending the deadlines for compliance with federal air quality 
standards, Congress incorporated modified versions of EPA's 
nonattainment and PSD programs.170 HREC had to comply with 
these statutory changes and the new EPA regulations imple-
menting them. 
1. EPA Review 
a. Nonattainment 
As one of the early tests of the emerging system for allowing 
growth in nonattainment areas, HREC's refinery posed several 
regulatory problems for which there were no easy answers. In 
late 1975, the SAPCB granted a permit to HREC because the 
refinery would use Best Available Control Technology (BACT),171 
and because regional oxidant levels were expected to decline by 
the time the refinery was operational. In April 1976, however, the 
EPA declared that the refinery was "environmentally un accept-
able." 172 
HREC representatives met with EPA and state officials shortly 
170. HREC was subject to both programs because the Hampton Roads area was not 
attaining the oxidant ambient standard while it had air cleaner than the national 
ambient standards for 802 and particulates. 
171. BACT is an especially strict level of air pollution control which prohibits the 
emission of any pollutant in excess of the applicable standard under 40 C.F.R. Parts 60 
and 61 (1983). For a current definition of BACT, see 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1976 & Supp. V 
1981). 
172. For a description of these early efforts to obtain a permit from the SAPCB, see 
H. Gabel & B. Seng, supra note 50. The SAPCB permit was challenged in court. See 
Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981). In their 
briefs, HREC, EPA, and SAPCB provide contrasting perspectives on the nature of their 
contact during the permit process. See supra text and note at note 179. 
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thereafter to discuss the EPA's concerns.173 The Agency sug-
gested that the refinery's emissions would be allowed if offsetting 
reductions were achieved at existing state or federal facilities.174 
This suggestion was consistent with the EPA's emerging offset 
policy, a draft of which was then being circulated.175 The policy, 
which would apply nation-wide, would allow industries siting in 
nonattainment areas to compensate for the new pollution they 
would add by obtaining emission reductions from existing pollut-
ers. The new pollution added would be "offset" by even greater 
reductions from existing polluters, thereby allowing new indus-
trial development while permitting continued progress toward 
achievement of national ambient standards. 
EPA published its national offset policy in December 1976, and 
as noted, the policy was incorporated in modified form in the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. In early 1977, the EPA pro-
posed an emission trade between the refinery and the Virginia 
highway department.176 By agreeing to change the materials it 
used in paving roads, the state highway department would reduce 
hydrocarbon emissions in an amount greater than the hydrocar-
bon emissions from the new refinery. The reductions would be 
made in several state highway districts surrounding the 
Hampton Roads region, up to 140 miles away. 
Working out the details of the offset and then gaining formal 
approval took approximately three years, and the process was far 
from a model of administrative efficiency and regularity.177 Pur-
suant to EPA regulations, Virginia submitted to the EPA a revi-
sion of its SIP that included a proposed emission offset to the 
refinery. There were disagreements, however, over monitoring 
and enforcement arrangements, and over compensating for emis-
173. Under the Clean Air Act's system of divided federal-state authority for permit-
ting, the EPA had authority to disapprove the state's permit for HREC. This led to the 
federal-state-HREC negotiations over permit terms. 
174. The rationale behind suggesting offsets at federal and state facilities was that 
offsets from government facilities might be easier to obtain than offsets from private 
facilities. 
175. Development of the EPA's offset policy is described in detail in R. LIROFF, AIR 
POLLUTION OFFSETS: TRADING, SELUNG, AND BANKING (1980). 
176. The trade would be similar to one that EPA had just developed to permit siting a 
new automobile plant in Pennsylvania. [d. at 13-17. 
177. HREC had to renew its permit at various times, and the permit in its many forms 
had to be reviewed by the EPA. The details of these administrative requirements can be 
found in H. Gabel & B. Seng, supra note 50, and in the Fourth Circuit's decision 
upholding the permit, Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183 (4th 
Cir. 1981). 
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sions during loading and unloading of cargoes at the marine 
terminal. Much time passed while the state awaited the results of 
the EPA's review of its submissions. Time also had to be allowed 
for public notice and comment. In January 1980, the EPA finally 
approved the SIP revision for the refinery.I78 
Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects, which had participated 
in many of the earlier administrative proceedings, filed suit in 
federal court. They challenged the EPA's approval of the offset. 
In a brief opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
EPA's actions.l79 
b. Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
Under the Clean Air Act, HREC had to apply directly to the 
EPA, not to the SAPCB, for its PSD permit. It did so in June 
1976.lffi The EPA issued the permit on July 25,1977, shortly before 
Congress's enactment of amendments to the Clean Air Act.ISI 
HREC submitted a second PSD application in June 1978, pur-
suant to the new statutory requirements.l82 The application was 
deemed complete by the EPA in August 1978, after HREC sub-
mitted additional informationy~3 Over one year later, in October 
1979, the EPA made a preliminary determination that the re-
finery satisfied PSD requirements.l84 A hearing on EPA's deter-
mination was held in November 1979, and the EPA issued the 
PSD permit in January 1980.185 
Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects filed suit challenging 
issuance of the permit. They maintained that insufficient 
meteorological data had been used for modeling air quality im-
pacts, that some existing and prospective emissions from other 
sources were underestimated or omitted, and that other errors 
178. 45 Fed. Reg. 6940 (Jan. 31, 1980). 
179. Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981). 
180. For details on the EPA's pre-1977 PSD program, see generally W. RODGERS, 
supra note 112. Briefly, the EPA was trying to fashion a PSD program in response to 
litigation, since the Clean Air Act of 1970 had provided virtually no guidance for design of 
such a policy. The EPA issued final regulations in 1974, which were upheld by the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1976. See Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency 
540 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
181. See Corps FSEIS, supra note 19, at 2-6. 
182. See Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 
1981). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
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had been made. Again in a brief opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals concluded that the EPA had not acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously, and upheld issuance of the permiU!l6 
2. Concluding Observations: Air Quality Issues 
The EPA's inexperience with the nonattainment and PSD pro-
grams contributed to the considerable time required for final 
federal approval of the permits for the refinery. HREC could 
rightfully complain about extra burdens being placed on it by 
changing rules and by the amount of time taken by the EPA to 
process its permit applications. Since the air quality permitting 
process paralleled the prolonged consultations that preceded is-
suance of the Corps' dredging permit, however, Clean Air Act 
requirements did not actually delay the project. Even had no 
further air-related regulatory action been required after the ini-
tial state air pollution permit was issued in October 1975, work on 
the refinery would still have awaited resolution of the difficult 
water-related issues raised during the Corps' permitting process. 
Thus, while changing Clean Air Act requirements undoubtedly 
added to HREC's expenses in seeking approval of the project, the 
Clean Air Act was not actually responsible for the delayed federal 
approval of the Hampton Roads refinery. 
IV. THE HAMPTON ROADS REFINERY PERMI1TING PROCESS: 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
A number of problems, both analytical and institutional, ac-
counted for the conflict and delay which plagued the Hampton 
Roads siting. The major analytical problems in the permitting 
process for the refinery were differences in perceptions of risk and 
continuing uncertainties about the real long-term need for the 
refinery. The major institutional problems were failure to develop 
useful information in a timely manner, and protracted and some-
what duplicative administrative reviews.1ST 
Might different administrative procedures have been used 
which could have reduced conflict, or at least accelerated the 
review process? With regard to the fragmentation of review at the 
186.Id. 
187. For similar conclusions reached by another analyst, see SENATE COMM. ON 
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBUC WORKS, ENERGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DELAYS: SIX 
CASE STUDIES 96th Congress, 1st Sess. 7 (Comm. Print 1979). 
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state level, it should be noted that in 1976, Virginia adopted a 
"Multiple Permit Coordination Process," administered by the Vir-
ginia Council on the Environment.1ss The process has not worked 
as originally contemplated, but it illustrates both the kinds of 
measures that can ease permit reviews, and the legal problems 
these measures can encounter. The process was established to 
consolidate and expedite reviews of projects requiring permits 
from several state agencies.111l An applicant could elect to submit a 
single, unified application to the Council's administrator.loo The 
Council administrator could consolidate formal hearings, elimi-
nate redundant procedures, and take other actions to expedite 
the review process.191 Within sixty days of the administrator 
deeming an application complete, a state agency would have to 
hold a hearing on it, and within ninety to one hundred and twenty 
days thereafter, the state agency would have to render a deci-
sion.192 
In March 1977, however, Virginia's Attorney General advised 
the Council that permits issued pursuant to the process might not 
be valid for several reasons: each agency, not the Council ad-
ministrator, is responsible under state statutes for determining 
when an application is complete; the time constraints imposed by 
corresponding federal laws and regulations could not be overriden 
by the new procedures, and decisions must be based on a hearing 
record limited to the scope of each permit and not on a single 
overall record. 193 As a result of this ruling, the Council does not 
advise permit applicants to request formal permit coordination, 
but instead urges pre-permit coordination designed to promote 
contact among project applicants and state agencies.l94 
Even if some consolidated hearing had been held on the initial 
HREC project proposal, the proceeding would have had to'be 
reopened, with attendant delay, when the project's wastewater 
treatment plans changed.195 Furthermore, without some impact 
188. VA. CODE § 10-184.2 (1950). 
189. See letter from Virginia Deputy Attorney General James E. Ryan, Jr. to Gerald 
McCarthy, Administrator, Governor's Council on the Environment (Mar. 25, 1977) (copy 
in author's file). 
190. VA. CODE § 10-184.2(A) (1950). 
191. Id. at § 10-184.2(B). 
192. Id. at § 10-184.2(D). 
193. See supra note 189. 
194. Information on the consequences ofthe Attorney-General's opinion was provided 
to the author by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation. 
195. See supra text and note at note 51. 
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statement-type disclosure document, which would have accu-
rately highlighted the significant environmental issues, it is far 
from clear that such an early, comprehensive hearing would have 
effectively considered accurate information on oil spills, or that 
interested citizens would have had a reasonable base of informa-
tion on which to comment. 
Elementary steps can be, and have been taken at the federal 
level to address some of the problems evident in the HREC pro-
ceeding. For example, in 1978, the federal Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) adopted new regulations for implementing 
the National Environmental Policy Act.l96 CEQ's regulations es-
tablished a new "scoping" mechanism.197 Scoping is a process by 
which decisions are made early as to what the central issues to be 
treated by an environmental impact statement will be. It is in-
tended to ensure that critical issues raised by a proposal can be 
identified prior to preparation of an EIS. This early identification 
reduces the possibility of important issues being overlooked dur-
ing the NEPA review, and encourages agencies to direct re-
sources to the analysis of the most significant environmental 
issues. The CEQ regulations also attempt to expedite project 
reviews by encouraging the setting of schedules for the steps to be 
taken in the NEPA process, and by promoting "piggybacking" of 
federal requirements onto state environmental impact assess-
ment requirements.198 
Had there been a scoping requirement at the time, perhaps 
more information would have been available earlier during the 
review of the HREC project. Even with scoping, inter-agency 
agreements would have required the multiple reviews of HREC's 
application for a "dredge and fill" permit. Perhaps these reviews 
might have been accomplished more quickly, however, if the nec-
essary information had been available earlier. Conceivably, the 
state and federal agencies, in consultation with HREC, could 
have agreed in advance that effects on the shellfishery were a 
significant issue, and that simulations would be used to develop 
data for review by all agencies. Perhaps there also could have 
been early agreement as to how the risk of oil spills from barges 
and tankers serving the refinery would be quantified. Such 
agreements might have speeded the process of inter-agency con-
196. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1983). 
197. [d. at § 1501.7. 
198. [d. at § 1506.2. 
1984] OIL VS. OYSTERS 747 
sultation at the federal level and provided a sounder administra-
tive record for the state permitting agencies. A scoping process 
probably would not have speeded the air quality permitting pro-
cess, however, because adjustments would have had to have been 
made to accommodate the new offset policy and changes in the 
Clean Air Act. 
Since the HREC controversy, steps have been taken to simplify 
the process for resolving disputes over Corps Section 404 per-
mits.l99 New inter-agency agreements have been signed reducing 
the number of stages through which a permit is elevated for 
review.200 New inter-agency agreements and regulations had been 
developed in 1980, but these provided for four layers of Washing-
ton review taking a minimum of thirteen months. Under new 
memoranda signed in 1982, a single Washington review is pro-
vided for which may not exceed 120 days in duration.201 The 
review must be requested by a senior Washington official of one of 
three agencies signing the memoranda (Department of the Inte-
rior, Department of Commerce, and Environmental Protection 
Agency), and must be approved by the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Civil Works.202 Appeal of the Corps decision is only 
permitted for cases in which a project raises environmental issues 
of national importance requiring senior level review, significant 
new information has been developed which was not previously 
available, and there has been insufficient inter-agency coordina-
tion.203 These streamlined procedures might help future projects 
like the Hampton Roads refinery. It is worth noting, however, 
that very few projects are subject at all to higher level review, so 
few evaluations will actually be expedited by these changes. For 
example, in fiscal year 1981, the Corps reported that it issued 
approximately 16,000 permits, and only twenty-five cases were 
reviewed in Washington because of failures to resolve disagree-
ments at lower levels.204 
The problems which HREC encountered in obtaining permits 
for its proposed project, and the administrative solutions that 
have been developed to address some of the problems, are some-
199. Corps Signs Memos on 404 Permits with EPA, Commerce, Interior, in AIRI 
WATER POLLUTION REPORT, 295 (July 26, 1982). 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
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what representative of the problems and responses The Conser-
vation Foundation found across the country in its study of the 
process of siting new facilities.205 When the industrial siting pro-
cess in the United States is examined closely with an eye toward 
identifying ways to remedy problems while maintaining envi-
ronmental protection goals, four main weaknesses can be pin-
pointed: 
1. The regulatory system's confusing structure needlessly 
lengthens the permitting process; 
2. The system creates uncertainty, which plagues industry; 
3. The system does not always produce environmentally 
sound decisions; 
4. Decisions often lack finality, since administrative deci-
sions can be reversed or challenged in court. 
Concern over these problems has prompted proposals for such 
"cure-all" reforms as one-stop permitting agencies and energy 
mobilization boards.206 Some measures would remove govern-
ments, agencies, and laws from the process, while others would 
consolidate permitting agencies into a single body with respon-
sibilities for all air, water, land-use, and other environmental 
programs and laws.207 Additional proposals would restrict citizen 
participation. 
Effective, long-lasting reform, however, may lie in an entirely 
different direction; "quiet," less radical reforms that focus on 
incremental changes in procedures and institutions might, in the 
long run, more effectively ease the siting process without need-
lessly sacrificing environmental goals. Federal, state, and local 
agencies are already experimenting with a host of techniques 
designed to improve management with methods used every day 
in business to make organizations run more smoothly. Most oper-
ate without specific authority and do not create new bureau-
cracies, add new regulations, or preempt existing laws. Some ex-
amples of promising approaches already in use include: use of 
voluntary decision schedules to help keep reviews on track while 
fostering cooperation among regulators and project proponents;208 
use of joint or consolidated hearings to reduce redundant meet-
205. See generally C.J. DUERKSEN, supra note 1. 
206. One-stop permitting can be found in Florida, under the Electrical Power Plant 
Siting Act, and in Washington, which has a state siting council. [d. at 118-20. 
207. [d. at 120-23. 
208. [d. at 130-40. 
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ings;209 scoping of impact assessments; establishment of "escort 
services" within state governments to help identify needed per-
mits, set up meetings with regulatory agencies, and monitor the 
permit process;210 and listing of sites that, for environmental rea-
sons, are either off-limits or potentially acceptable for industries 
beginning a site-selection process.211 
Unless the proper foundation for change is laid, however, these 
and other reforms may never be implemented, or, if they are 
implemented, simply might not work. A few basic precautions can 
help keep them from failing. For example, maintaining the integ-
rity of the systems now in place should be a primary goal in all 
efforts to ease the review process. Two ways to do this are to make 
sure that necessary checks and balances are not eliminated, and 
to involve all interested parties in designing the reforms. In addi-
tion, regulators should not be burdened with new duties that 
cannot be met because funds or personnel are lacking. 
Many problems in the regulatory system arise because the 
needs of corporate project planning do not always mesh well with 
regulators' needs; poor communication between industry and 
regulators is rife. However, to the extent that industries are able 
and willing to develop environmental assessments early in their 
planning processes, the permitting process can be eased by afford-
ing early participation by government officials and the public, and 
by adopting other reforms suggested here. 
In some cases, however, even if a complete information record 
could be developed early, and commitments were made by project 
proponents to minimize predictable and mitigable environmental 
impacts, the threats to environmental resources might be so 
feared that a project's opponents would use all available legal 
means to stop it. The demise of such projects, particularly ones for 
which there is an undeniable public need, might lead to proposals 
to get bothersome citizen groups, as well as some agencies, out of 
the approval process altogether. This might eliminate the creep-
ing paralysis that seems to be afflicting government decision 
making. Cutting back on participation, however, is likely to create 
more problems than it solves. Siting dubious projects by shuffling 
them through truncated approval processes can diminish the 
209. Maryland, Florida, Oregon and other states provide for consolidated hearings. 
For the pros and cons of such hearings, see id. at 154-56. 
210. For examples from Georgia and California, see id. at 156-57. 
211. For examples from Maryland, San Francisco, and Europe, see id. at 123-25. 
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legitimacy of government and lead to undesirable and avoidable 
environmental impacts. Democratic processes can be awkward 
and uncomfortable, but openness promotes examination of all 
sides of an issue, and helps insure that all pertinent information is 
available to decision makers. Balancing the need for speed and 
certainty against the need for the full airing of issues will never 
be easy; but incremental reforms such as scoping can address the 
biggest sources of delay, while promoting the protection of envi-
ronmental and democratic values. 
V. CONCLUSION 
An examination of the ten-year attempt by the Hampton Roads 
Energy Company to win regulatory approval of its proposal to site 
an oil refinery in Portsmouth, Virginia, illustrates the difficulties 
faced by those wishing to site new industrial facilities in areas 
which are sensitive to the potential environmental threat posed 
by such facilities. Multiple permit requirements, regulatory de-
lays, fragmented jurisdiction, inter-agency conflicts, the difficul-
ties of environmental risk assessment, and other problems can 
make the permitting process long and frustrating for project 
promoters. Federal and state agency efforts to balance the poten-
tial benefits of the refinery against the potential resulting harm 
to Virginia's valuable oyster population from an oil spill highlight 
some of the problems inherent in measuring the merits and 
drawbacks of a proposed siting. Perceptions of the actual risk 
which the facility posed to the oyster seed beds varied consid-
erably among and within agencies and depended upon the type 
of analysis used. Opinions as to the potential local and national 
benefits of the refinery were similarly diverse. The variety of 
opinions led to agency disputes which prolonged considerably the 
permitting process. 
From a policy perspective, however, the delay was not without 
its benefits. By the later stages of the review, information avail-
able to federal agencies evaluating spill risk had been consid-
erably improved. In addition, a slow, conflict-ridden deliberative 
process provides greater assurance that decisions are made based 
on a thorough analysis of available information and competing 
policy considerations. 
It is possible to streamline the permitting process while still 
ensuring that siting proposals receive thorough and adequate 
consideration. Some beneficial reforms have already been im-
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plemented since the Hampton Roads facility was first proposed. 
The Virginia "Multiple Permit Coordination Process," the new 
NEPA scoping mechanism, and the Corps' efforts to simplify the 
section 404 permit process, are examples of ways in which state 
and federal agencies can expedite permit application review. Such 
reforms, adopted incrementally, are preferable to sweeping pro-
posals which threaten to sacrifice deliberate and thorough con-
sideration of environmental risks for expediency. The Hampton 
Roads example indicates that some reforms may be necessary. It 
also demonstrates, however, that the systems now in place, 
though clumsy, serve to ensure that conflicting ideas, policies, and 
information are given an opportunity to compete in forums which 
provide for participation by policy-makers, as well as individuals 
and citizen groups, with a broad range of interests. Industrial 
siting proposals are thus subjected to more rigorous scrutiny than 
would be provided by some of the truncated procedures proposed. 
Presumably, a broader range of interests are thereby served. 
VI. POSTSCRIPT 
In only one lawsuit have environmentalists successfully chal-
lenged a permit for the refinery. In July 1983, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Secretary 
of the Army had violated NEPA, the Administrative Procedure 
Act, and other laws, by failing to give environmental groups and 
others an opportunity to review and comment on the Army staff 
paper, the basis for the Secretary's decision to issue a dredge and 
fill permit to HREC.212 This failure was an important procedural 
oversight, because the staff paper contained considerable infor-
mation and analysis absent from the environmental impact 
statements. The judge ordered the permit vacated; both HREC 
and the federal government have appealed the decision, although 
it appears that the oversight could be readily remedied and the 
permit reissued.21:3 The National Wildlife Federation, which 
brought the suit, has also appealed, because the judge rejected its 
claim that the Secretary of the Army's decision to issue the 
permit was substantively arbitrary and capricious.214 
212. National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985 (D. D.C. 1983). 
213. The army could simply prepare another supplemental environmental impact 
statement, provide for public comment, and reissue the permit. 
214. Notice of Cross Appeal filed on November 5,1983 in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia. 
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The refinery's fate, however, may not depend on the outcome of 
this lawsuit, but on another suit only indirectly related to the 
environmental impacts of the refinery. When Cox Enterprises 
purchased the project site from a subsidiary of the Norfolk and 
Western Railway in 1974, it did so on the condition that construc-
tion begin within six years; otherwise, the railroad could repur-
chase the land. In 1980, the railroad filed suit to reclaim the site 
from Cox Enterprises, for possible use as a coal export facility. 
The Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk held in favor of Norfolk 
and Western.215 HREC appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, 
which is expected to hear arguments and issue a ruling in 1984. 
The appeals in the National Wildlife Federation's lawsuit will not 
move forward until the ownership issue is resolved. 
ApPENDIX-PERMIT CHRONOLOGY 
04'74-Cox Enterprises subsidiary acquires refinery site from subsidiary 
of Norfolk and Western Railway. 
03l75---HREC submits permit application to Corps of Engineers for fed-
eral dredging permit, and permit application to Virginia Marine Re-
sources Commission (VMRC) for state subaqueous permit. 
05l75---HREC submits permit application to State Air Pollution Control 
Board (SAPCB) and application for "401 Certificate" to State Water 
Control Board (SWCB). 
07175---HREC submits environmental impact assessment to Corps. 
08l75---SAPCB holds public hearing on HREC air permit. 
09175---VMRC holds public hearing on HREC permit application. 
10175---VMRC, by 4-3 vote, approves HREC application for subaqueous 
permit. SAPCB, by unanimous vote, issues state air permit. 
11175---Corps publishes draft EIS. 
01l76-Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects organized. 
01l76-SWCB, by unanimous vote, issues "401 Certificate." 
04'76-Corps public hearing on dredging permit. EPA states refinery is 
environmentally unacceptable. EPA, SAPCB, and HREC begin discus-
sions of "offset" required for new emissions from refinery. 
06176-VMRC permit upheld by Virginia Circuit Court, in challenge by 
Tidewater Refineries Opposition Fund. HREC files for first PSD permit 
from EPA, under then-existing rules. 
215. Virginia Holding Corp. v. Trailsend Land Company, No. C-80-659 (Cir. Ct. for the 
City of Norfolk, August 10, 1981). 
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09176-Corps seeks additional information from HREC, including oil spill 
risk assessment. 
10176-HREC submits application for NPDES permit to State Water 
Control Board. 
12176-SWCB holds public hearing on HREC NPDES permit application. 
01f77-SWCB deadlocks, 3-3, on motion to deny NPDES permit to HREC, 
when one member abstains. 
02l77-SWCB approves NPDES permit, by 4-2 vote. 
04l77-Corps receives answers to September 1976 inquiries to HREC. 
07177-EPA issues PSD permit to HREC, just prior to congressional 
enactment of amendments to Clean Air Act. 
08i77-Corps issues final EIS. 
10177-SAPCB reissues air permit to HREC, including offset. 
11f77-SAPCB submits SIP revision request to EPA, seeking formal 
approval of offset. 
12177-Virginia Governor Godwin expresses support for HREC proposal, 
in anticipation of permit denial by Corps District Engineer. 
01f78-Corps District Engineer recommends to higher Corps authorities 
that Corps dredging permit be denied. 
02178-U.S. District Court, in first of series of opinions, rejects efforts by 
the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Citizens Against the Refinery's 
Effects to overturn award of NPDES permit. 
05l78-NPDES permit upheld by Virginia Circuit Court, in challenge by 
Virginia Oyster Packers and Planters Association. 
06l78-HREC applies to EPA for new PSD permit, under revised rules. 
08i78-HREC PSD application completed. 
09178-Corps issues final supplemental EIS. 
I0178-Proposed SIP revision published for comment in Federal Register, 
following additional exchanges between SAPCB and EPA. Offset for 
vessel emissions at marine terminal not included. 
11f78-Chief of Corps of Engineers issues preliminary opinion supporting 
issuance of Corps permit. 
12178-NOAA releases ECO report on oil spill risks, restates opposition to 
award of Corps permit. 
02l79-Corps reports results of oil spill simulation in Chesapeake Bay 
model. 
05179-EPA publishes revised offset proposal, including terminal emis-
sions, in Federal Register. 
10179-Preliminary EPA determination to issue PSD permit. Prelimi-
nary decision to issue Corps permit announced by Secretary of the Army. 
12179-Secretary of the Army orders issuance of Corps permit. 
01f80---EPA gives final approval to offset and to PSD permit. 
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07/80---U.S. District Court rejects continuing efforts by Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation to overturn NPDES permit. 
09/80---National Wildlife Federation and other environmental groups file 
suit in federal court, challenging Corps permit. 
10/80---Norfoik and Western Railway subsidiary files suit in state court 
seeking to reclaim refinery site. 
03l81-U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upholds EPA's offset and 
PSD approvals, in challenge filed by Citizens Against the Refinery's 
Effects. 
08l81-Virginia Court rules that Norfolk and Western Railway sub-
sidiary is entitled to repurchase refinery site. HREC appeals decision. 
07/83-U.S. District Court for District of Columbia enjoins Corps from 
issuing dredge and fill permit to HREC, citing violations of procedural 
requirements of federal laws and Corps regulations. 
